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WORKING PAPER UNDER REVIEW– PLEASE DO NO CIRCULATE WITHOUT AUTHORS PERMISSION 
 
Abstract Trust-based interactions with robots are increasingly common in the marketplace, workplace, on 
the road, and in the home. However, a looming concern is that people may not trust robots as they do 
humans. While trust in fellow humans has been studied extensively, little is known about how people 
extend trust to robots. Here we compare trust-based investments and emotions from across three nearly 
identical economic games: human-human trust games, human-robot trust games, and human-robot trust 
games where the robot decision impacts another human. Robots in our experiment mimic humans: they 
are programmed to make reciprocity decisions based on previously observed behaviors by humans in 
analogous situations. We find that people invest similarly in humans and robots. By contrast, the social 
emotions elicited by the interactions (but not non-social emotions) differed across human and robot trust 
games, and did so lawfully. Emotional reactions depended on how one’s trust game decision interacted 
with the partnered agent’s decision, and whether another person was affected economically and 
emotionally. 
Keywords: Trust, Robots, Artificial Intelligence, Emotion, Experiment 
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Introduction 
Trust-based interactions between humans and robots are increasingly common in healthcare, the 
marketplace, at home, and on the road (Lee, Knox, Baumann, Breazeal, & DeSteno, 2013; Schaefer, Chen, 
Szalma, & Hancock, 2016). People are more likely to interact with automation, artificial intelligence (AI), 
and robots that they can trust (Lee & See, 2004). However, a psychology that evolved to navigate 
interactions with fellow humans regulates this trust, and people worry that we may overly-trust robots 
(Robinette, Li, Allen, Howard, & Wagner, 2016; Salem, Lakatos, Amirabdollahian, & Dautenhahn, 2015). 
But if over-trusting robots is a problem, so is under-trusting benign robots and thus foregoing various 
benefits. Previous work shows that emotions calibrate trust when people interact with fellow humans 
(Schniter & Sheremeta, 2014). Whether emotions affect trust-based interactions with robots remains an 
open question. Some view robots as not capable of being “socially and psychologically present” in terms 
of benevolence, other-regard, and integrity (Gefen & Straub, 2004). For example, in their interactions with 
automated online vendors, people perceive them as “agentic” (e.g. capable of reliable response) but 
lacking in “experiential” mental states such as having desires, feelings, and emotions (Rai & Diermeier, 
2015). Further, trust could also be affected by whether robots act alone or on behalf of other humans 
whom they affect. As robots and AI increasingly replace human agency, we find ourselves in interactions 
with non-human robotic agents and automated systems that can affect not only us, but also the welfare 
of other humans they serve (Clark, 2003; Groom & Nass, 2007).  
Despite the problems identified with trust in autonomous systems, there is little agreement over how 
much trust is appropriate or otherwise expected (e.g., how much do people normally trust one another 
and robots, and how much does this vary?). Across a number of studies, researchers have shown that 
humans initially act towards computers and robots as they do towards humans, applying social norms (Rai 
& Diermeier, 2015). Meanwhile, “uncanny valley” phenomena challenges this equivalence by highlighting 
people’s distrust and revulsion when interacting with virtual agents that closely resemble humans, rather 
than the trust and empathy they feel with fellow humans (Mathur & Reichling, 2016). Conflicting results 
may stem from inconsistent and inappropriate research methods. Hancock et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis 
of trust in human-robot interactions noted with concern that current knowledge of trust in robots is 
derived almost exclusively from subjective responses, rather than more objective methods such as 
incentive-compatible economic trust games. Deception of participants by experimenters is also common 
across human-robot interaction studies and may contribute to unreliable responses. The concern is over 
discrepancies between subjective response and behavior: for example, while people report they trust a 
robot, their behavior shows mistrust.  
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Here we report the results of an anonymous trust-game experiment. In it, a human investor first decides 
how much of a $10 endowment to entrust to a trustee. The experimenter multiplies the entrusted amount 
by three - creating potential gains from trust. Then the trustee receives this and decides how much to 
reciprocate to the investor. The standard game theoretic (Nash equilibrium) prediction is that trustees 
will keep everything that is entrusted to them. Further, investors are predicted to anticipate this and thus 
entrust nothing. In trust games, however, most people demonstrate trust and reciprocation such that, 
often, both investors and trustees benefit (Johnson & Mislin, 2011).  
In our experiment, human investors interact with one of three types of trustees: a fellow human, a robot, 
or a robot whose payoffs go to another human. We programmed robot trustees to mimic previously 
observed reciprocation by human trustees. After the trust-game interaction, participants rate how much 
they feel various positive and negative emotions. Our experimental design allows us to illuminate three 
important aspects of trust in robots. First, we can determine how much humans trust robots compared 
to fellow humans. To do this we rely on versions of the “trust game” (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). 
The trust game measures the degree to which people are willing to invest resources in a trustee partner 
(here, a human vs. a robot) that is capable of either assisting the investor in attaining rewards or exploiting 
the investor. Due to its frequent use in labs across the world, we have prior knowledge of how much 
people normally trust one another and respond to trust, and how much this varies. Previous work has 
suggested that people make trust game investments in others because of both altruism (i.e., “other-
regard”) and anticipation of positive reciprocity (i.e., “self-regard”) (Cox, 2004). Interactions with 
autonomous robots can bring about the latter but not the former, because there is no actual human that 
one might benefit. This other-regarding perspective suggests less investment in robots than in humans 
(or in robots that affect other humans). However, another possibility is that people make trust-game 
investments to gain both money and information about humans’ behavioral propensities: to learn about 
the trustworthiness of others (informing how successfully they can develop trust-based exchange 
relationships) and in anticipation of positive reciprocity (Schniter, Sheremeta, & Shields, 2015). This 
perspective suggests no investment difference across human or robot trustee, since in both interactions 
with other humans and in interactions with our robots (programmed to mimic human behavior), 
participants can also learn about the cooperativeness of fellow humans. 
The second way we develop knowledge about trust in robots is by comparing the patterns of emotional 
reactions generated in trust-based interactions with robots and fellow humans. Below we explain how 
emotions regulate trust behavior and are triggered by trust interaction outcomes characteristic of distinct 
3 
 
adaptive problems (Schniter et al., 2015) – problems which are not equally present across our 
experimental conditions.  
Theory and Predictions 
Solving some of the adaptive problems that our human ancestors faced would have required the 
orchestration of motivation, behavior, physiology, and communication. Emotions appear to be evolved 
adaptations engineered to orchestrate those systems (Nesse, 1990; Tooby, 1985; Tooby & Cosmides, 
2008). An emotion calibrates multiple functionally specialized systems, or adaptations, to those 
parameters that would have constituted a beneficial response to a recurrent adaptive problem.  
Non-social emotions (e.g. contentment, frustration) guide behavior to maximize benefits and minimize 
costs in the non-social realm. By contrast, social emotions (e.g. gratitude, anger, pride, guilt) respond to 
successes and failures in the social domain. As we trade off the possible benefits from selfish and 
cooperative pursuits, we need to integrate the successes and failures of past experiences. Emotions help 
guide our behavior in decision dilemmas: for example, by recalibrating how much we value another’s 
welfare (Al-Shawaf, Conroy-Beam, Asao, & Buss, 2016; Gómez-Miñambres & Schniter, 2017; Sznycer, 
Cosmides, & Tooby, 2017; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008).  
Trust interactions are decision dilemmas that require decision makers to choose between competing goals 
that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled at their maxima. From a non-social and individualist perspective, 
the trust game provides an opportunity for gaining resources. From a social perspective, the trust game 
also provides valuable information about the trusting and trustworthy character demonstrated by others. 
We use information about others’ cooperativeness to avoid exploitation and develop reliable trust-based 
exchange relationships that provide a security against income risks associated with luck (Kaplan, Schniter, 
Smith, & Wilson, 2012, 2018). 
Various social and non-social emotions are relevant in the context of trust games. For example, emotions 
such as anger, gratitude, and guilt have been shown to guide behavior in human-human trust interactions 
(Schniter & Sheremeta, 2014; Smith, Pedersen, Forster, McCullough, & Lieberman, 2017; Sznycer, 2019). 
Further, under anonymous conditions in the laboratory, specific emotions such as anger, gratitude, guilt, 
pride, contentment and frustration result from trust game interactions (Schniter et al., 2015; Schniter & 
Shields, 2013) and lawfully predict behavior in subsequent trust games with the same person (Schniter & 
Sheremeta, 2014). Here we extend past work by studying the pattern of activation of social and non-social 
emotions in trust games with human and robot partners. 
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Next, we summarily review what is known about the emotions studied here: anger, gratitude, guilt, pride, 
frustration, and contentment. 
Social Emotions 
Gratitude is triggered by indications that a partner values one’s welfare more than anticipated. Being 
extended trust and receiving benefits that are costly to deliver are two potent cues that a partner values 
one’s welfare, and therefore can trigger gratitude. Once activated, gratitude functions to cement the 
cooperative relationship. To do so, the gratitude system up-regulates the value attached to the partner’s 
welfare. Additionally, the gratitude system may signal to its target that this recalibration has taken place. 
In turn, grateful revaluation of the other’s welfare makes it more likely that the partner will continue to 
cooperate given the opportunity (Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; McCullough, 
Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001; Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968). 
Anger is triggered by cues that a social partner insufficiently values one’s welfare. Examples of such cues 
include: unwillingness to benefit one’s self even at low personal cost, and failure to extend the trust that 
might start or augment a mutually beneficial relationship (Sell et al., 2017). Once activated, anger 
functions to incentivize the target of the anger to value the angry person’s welfare more. To do so, the 
anger system deploys various types of bargaining tactics designed to render enhanced aid and assistance 
the more economical option for the target of the anger; for example: threats of (or actual) withdrawal of 
assistance, and threats of (or actual) aggressive imposition of costs (Sell, 2011).  
Pride appears to be designed to promote the social value of the individual in the minds of others. Pride 
motivates the achievement of socially valued acts—acts whose discovery by others would cause them to 
increase their valuation of the individual’s welfare. Once achieved, pride advertises those acts and 
internally rewards their continuance (Lea & Webley, 1997; Sznycer et al., 2018; Tracy, Shariff, & Cheng, 
2010; Williams & DeSteno, 2008). The evolutionary origin of human pride lies in phylogenetically ancient 
systems undergirding dominance interactions (Fessler, 1999; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). Indeed, behavioral 
dominance is still a reliable source of pride and social status (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & 
Henrich, 2013). In strategic economic interactions, earning a larger payout can imply economic 
dominance. Notwithstanding pride’s association with dominance, in cooperative contexts the activation 
of this emotion depends on the individual making positive contributions to others  (Cheng et al., 2013; 
Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 2012; Smith, 1759). Successful cooperation in a trust game provides 
players the opportunity to benefit themselves by maximizing personal earnings, as well as the opportunity 
to benefit their partners by investing and reciprocating. Thus, players in a trust game could be proud of 
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the money they earned for themselves and they could be proud because of the benefit they provided 
their partners.  
The mind should positively value another’s welfare when the other’s welfare is intrinsically valuable to 
the individual’s own welfare (e.g., as is the case with  kin, mates, friends) (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). 
Insufficiently valuing a valuable other is costly for the offender, even when the under-valued other fails 
to angrily contest or notice the insufficient valuation (Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002; Sznycer, 
2010; Sznycer et al., 2016). The cost incurred for under-valuing valuable others can be abated by up-
regulating one’s valuation of their welfare. This is, by hypothesis, the evolved function of guilt. Guilt is 
triggered by indications that one has insufficiently valued the welfare of a valuable other: for example, by 
failing to help at relatively low personal cost or by failing to extend trust, for example. When triggered, 
guilt interrupts and discourages the imposition of costs on the other (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 
1995; Cohen, Panter, & Turan, 2013; Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2014; Schniter & Shields, 2013) 
and motivates actions to benefit the other and to restore the relationship (Baumeister, Stillwell, & 
Heatherton, 1994; Baumeister et al., 1995): amends, apologies, confessions, and perspective-taking (De 
Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Ohtsubo & 
Yagi, 2015; Schniter, Sheremeta, & Sznycer, 2013; Sznycer, Schniter, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2015; Tangney, 
1991). For example, trustees who feel guilty about their behavior in previous trust-based interactions are 
more likely to apologize (Schniter & Sheremeta, 2014). 
Non-social emotions 
In contrast with the social emotions discussed above, frustration and contentment are triggered by the 
non-social component of an individual’s failures and successes.  Frustration is a feeling of dissatisfaction 
that results when obstacles prevent the achievement of personal goals (Harrington, 2005). Frustration is 
known to be triggered by interactions with computers that don’t result in desired goals (Klein, Moon, & 
Picard, 2002). Frustration downregulates the motivation to repeat previous behaviors that inhibited the 
realization of goals (Klein et al., 2002).  
Many activities associated with contentment pertain to the individual and are unrelated to social activities 
(Berenbaum, 2002). Unlike feelings of frustration, which are triggered by things getting in the way of one’s 
goals, feelings of contentment arise when things more successfully go one’s way: in situations with greater 
certainty and a lack of perceived obstacles (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). Contentment has been identified as 
a positive feeling of satisfaction, rest, and safety that follows achievement of personal goals (Ellsworth & 
Smith, 1988; Fredrickson, 1998; Harlé & Sanfey, 2010; Kreibig, 2010). Various lines of research suggest 
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that contentment encourages one to reflect on one’s successful goal attainment experiences (Christie & 
Friedman, 2004). Contentment may also discourage risk taking and other potentially mood changing 
behaviors (Herzenstein & Gardner, 2009).  
 
Human condition of the trust game 
 
Robot1 condition of the trust game 
 
Robot2 condition of the trust game 
 
Fig. 1. Human, Robot1, and Robot2 conditions of the trust game. 
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We study trust and emotions across three conditions of the Trust game that we call Human, Robot1, and 
Robot2. In the Human condition a human participant (Person 1) in the role of investor is paired with a 
human participant (Person 2) in the role of trustee. In the Robot1 condition a human (Person 1) in the role 
of investor is paired with a robot in the role of trustee. In the Robot2 condition a human participant 
(Person 1) in the role of investor is paired with a robot in the role of trustee that acts on behalf of a passive 
participant (Person 2). Figure 1 depicts the basic experimental set up with conditions, see Methods section 
for further details.  
The goals that non-social emotions such as contentment (or frustration) help guide us towards (or away 
from) are present in all three conditions of the trust game (Human, Robot1, and Robot2). Higher (or lower) 
earnings are expect to trigger contentment (or frustration) in participants in all roles. By contrast, social 
emotions are expected in interactions where human partners are affected directly or indirectly, but not 
in interactions with robots. 
Predictions 
We expect no investment difference across conditions (Prediction 1). This is because all conditions provide 
Person 1s an opportunity to gain both money and information about the trustworthiness of other people 
in the sample.  
What differs across our experimental conditions is how the trustee is affected by and affects the investor. 
In interactions with robot trustees, the investor does not interact with a decision maker who experiences 
emotions and that intentionally decides whether and how much to reciprocate. Furthermore, the robot 
trustees in this study do not derive any benefits from monetary transfers to them. Beneficiaries of trust-
based investment only exist in the Human and Robot2 conditions. 
We assess two non-social emotions (contentment and frustration) and four social emotions (guilt, 
gratitude, anger, and pride) that participants report after trust-based interactions in these Human, 
Robot1, and Robot2 conditions. We expect no difference across conditions for the experience of non-
social emotions: higher personal earnings should cause people contentment, while lower personal 
earnings should cause their frustration (Prediction 2). On the other hand, the social emotions experienced 
in response to trust games with humans, robots, and robots that affect other humans are expected to 
differ. Humans recognize robots as unable to understand or respond to social emotions (Gray, Gray, & 
Wegner, 2007). As a result, humans respond to these emotionally vacuous and automatic agents with 
indifference to their welfare (Haslam, 2006). For this reason, we expect that interactions with robots will 
not elicit the same intensity of social emotions that interactions with humans do. 
8 
 
In trust games, a Person 1’s decision to invest smaller (or larger) portions of their endowment will directly 
affect a Person 2’s economic opportunity. Because of this, we expect Person 1’s investment to positively 
predict Person 1’s pride and negatively predict Person 1’s guilt. However, this should be so only in the 
conditions where a human Person 2 exists (i.e., Human and Robot2 conditions). In contrast, these 
relationships should be weaker or null in the Robot1 condition, where no human Person 2 exists 
(Prediction 3). We expect the Person 2 (the trustee in the Human condition and the passive beneficiary in 
the Robot2 condition) to react emotionally with gratitude (or anger) in response to Person 1’s higher (or 
lower) investment (Prediction 4).  
When reciprocation occurs, Person 1s make gains from investments in trustees. When non-reciprocation 
occurs, Person 1s suffer losses on investments in trustees. Being the target of non-reciprocation causes 
Person 1’s anger, while being the beneficiary of reciprocation causes Person 1s gratitude in the Human 
condition. However, because Person 1 is not expected to hold the passive human beneficiary in the 
Robot2 condition responsible for the automated reciprocity decision made by the robot, this effect should 
not be as strong in the Robot1 and Robot2 conditions (Prediction 5). From the perspective of a Person 2 
who has made a reciprocation (or non-reciprocation) decision in the role of trustee, pride (or guilt) is 
expected. In the Robot2 condition, we do not expect these pride or guilt effects to be as strong; the Person 
2s are passive (making no decisions) and the reciprocation or non-reciprocation decision affecting both 
players is automated (Prediction 6). We provide a summary of these predictions in Table 1. 
Table 1. Predictions for Human, Robot1, and Robot2 conditions of the trust game. 
 
Prediction 1 No difference in investment is expected across conditions. 
Prediction 2 Contentment (frustration) is positively correlated with higher(lower) personal earnings 
for Person 1 and Person 2 in all conditions. 
Prediction 3 Higher (or lower) investment affects Person 1 pride (guilt) more in the Human and 
Robot2 condition. 
Prediction 4 Higher (or lower) investment affects Person 2 gratitude (anger) more in the Human 
and Robot2 condition. 
Prediction 5 Reciprocation (non-reciprocation) affects Person 1 gratitude (anger) more in the 
Human condition. 
Prediction 6 Reciprocation (non-reciprocation) affects Person 2 pride (guilt) more in the Human 
condition. 
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Material and methods 
We recruited a convenience sample of 387 participants from a campus-wide subject pool consisting 
primarily of undergraduate students. Participants who previously participated in trust experiments were 
not recruited. Using a between-subjects design, we compared behaviors and emotions from human 
investors (n = 85) in a trust game with human trustees (n=85) (the “Human” condition) to behaviors and 
emotions from two nearly identical trust games that we call the Robot1 and Robot2 conditions. The 
Robot1 trust game features human investors (n = 71) and a virtual trustee that we call the “robot”. The 
Robot2 trust game features human investors (n = 73) and robot trustees linked to a passive human 
beneficiary of the robot’s payoff that otherwise does not decide or do anything (n = 73).  
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). No participant participated more than 
once. Each session had between 10 and 24 participants, seated in individual cubicles, and lasted 
approximately 35 minutes. Sessions were conducted as follows. An experimenter read the instructions 
aloud explaining experimental procedures and payoffs while participants followed along with their own 
copy of the instructions. After finishing the instructions, participants were given five minutes to privately 
answer a quiz testing their comprehension of the instructions. After participants completed the quiz, the 
experimenter distributed a printed copy of the correct answers. To ensure understanding, the 
experimenter answered any remaining questions privately. 
Participants, randomly assigned to the roles of ‘‘Person 1” (investor) or ‘‘Person 2” (the trustee in the 
“Human” condition, or the passive recipient in the “Robot2” condition), interacted anonymously in the 
trust game over a local computer network. Earnings from the trust game plus a $7 participation fee were 
paid out privately at the end of the experiment. 
In the baseline trust game (“Human” condition), participants were randomly assigned to roles of “Person 
1” or “Person 2”. Person 1 was endowed with $10 and could transfer any portion to Person 2, which was 
tripled upon receipt. Person 2 then chose to return to Person 1 a portion of the amount received. In our 
trust games with robots, all participants in the Person 1 role had the option to send any whole dollar 
portion of their endowment to a “robot”, with the amount sent tripled. Participants in the Robot1 
condition were told that after they transfer an amount x, the “robot” randomly selects a return amount 
to transfer back to Person 1 from those in a set of observed returns made by people in response to tripled 
transfers of amount x in a previous trust game experiment (the Human condition; see instructions Online 
Supplementary Materials A). In the Robot2 condition, participants were assigned to roles of Person 1 or 
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Person 2, with the Person 2 role different than in the Human condition. In the Robot2 condition we 
explained the role played by the robot to all participants, as above, but with the additional feature that 
any of the tripled transfer amount not returned to Person 1 by the robot would be kept by a passive 
Person 2 who makes no decisions. 
After playing the trust game, participants completed a 20-item emotion survey (see Online Supplementary 
Materials B) based on the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). Participants used a 5-point Likert scale to report the extent to which they felt each of various 
emotions. 
Results  
Consistent with prior results in the literature, we observed substantial variability in individual behavior, 
with many participants showing trust with investment and trustworthiness with reciprocation. Figure 2 
displays the bubble plot of the amount invested and the amount returned for 387 participants in the 
Human, Robot1, and Robot2 conditions. Overall, our results are consistent with previous findings of Berg 
et al. (1995) and reported in panel A of Table 2. On average, Person 1 invested and was returned 
comparable amounts across conditions, resulting in comparable earnings for Person 1 and Person 2 across 
conditions. We find no significant differences in Person 1 earnings (p = .68) or Person 2 earnings (p = .93) 
across conditions using the Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test (hereafter Kruskal-Wallis). For 
interactions with investments greater than zero we find the effects of net “Reciprocation” (return-
investment) and net “Non-reciprocation” (investment-return) to be comparable across conditions using 
Kruskal-Wallis (p = .64). 
Comparing participants’ interactions with humans to interactions with robots, we highlight important 
similarities: humans and robots are trusted similarly across conditions (Result A) and non-social emotions 
are similarly triggered by one’s own earnings (Result B). We also highlight important differences in social 
emotions resulting from Human, Robot1, and Robot2 trust game interactions (Result C). 
Investment 
Result A: Investment amounts by Person 1 are similar across the Human, Robot1, and Robot2 conditions 
(Prediction 1).  
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Fig. 2. Bubble plot of the amount invested and the amount returned by trustee to Person 1, by 
condition. Note: Relative size of bubbles indicate the number of observations. Smallest bubble = 1 
observation; largest bubble = 8 observations.  
 
Similar distributions of investment amounts are seen across conditions. A Kruskal-Wallis test indicates no 
significant differences in investment distributions between conditions (p = .99). Provided a novel trust-
based exchange opportunity, participants are as likely to trust humans (N = 85, Mdn = $6.5), as they are 
to trust robots in the Robot1 condition (N = 71, Mdn investment = $6.0) or Robot2 condition (N = 73, Mdn 
= $6.0); a Mood’s median test finds no differences in median investment across conditions (p = .183).  
In addition, we find no significant differences in the fraction of participants who choose not to invest 
across conditions (13%, 7% and 5% for the Human, Robot1, and Robot2 conditions, respectively) using a 
Kruskal-Wallis test (p = .212).  Likewise, we find no significant differences in the fraction of participants 
who choose to investment the maximum across conditions (32%, 24% and 19% for the Human, Robot1, 
and Robot2 conditions, respectively) using a Kruskal-Wallis test (p = .184). 
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Table 2. 
Panel A: Independent Variables used in OLS Regressions (Mean and SD reported) 
  Earnings Reciprocation/ 
Treatment Investment Person 1 Person 2 Non-reciprocation* 
Human 6.01 10.14 11.88 0.17 
  N = 85 (74*) 3.64 3.72 7.12 3.98 
Robot1 6.11 9.79  -0.23 
  N = 71 (66*) 2.99 3.4  3.53 
Robot2 6.18 10.4 11.95 0.43 
  N = 73 (69*) 2.86 3.17 4.64 3.26 
Kruskal-Wallis 
rank test  
𝜒𝜒2(2) = 0.01 𝜒𝜒2(2) = 0.76 𝜒𝜒2(1) < 0.01 𝜒𝜒2(2) = 0.91 
p = .999 p = .684 p = .932 p = .635 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variables used in OLS Regressions (Mean and SD reported) 
 Contentment Frustration Gratitude Anger Pride Guilt 
Treatment 
Person 
1 
Person 
2 
Person 
1 
Person 
2 
Person 
1* 
Person 
2 
Person 
1* 
Person 
2 
Person 
1 
Person 
2* 
Person 
1 
Person 
2* 
Human 3.44 3.13 1.74 2.01 3.07 3.21 1.72 1.88 2.76 2.93 1.53 1.86 
  N = 85 (74*) 1.35 1.45 1.26 1.48 1.64 1.63 1.16 1.34 1.33 1.56 1.02 1.34 
Robot1 3.25  2.14  2.80  1.80  2.24  1.34  
  N = 71 (66*) 1.32  1.29  1.36  1.10  1.20  0.75  
Robot2 3.26 3.30 1.73 1.74 3.17 3.27 1.51 1.53 2.41 2.22 1.40 1.22 
  N = 73 (69*) 1.19 1.20 1.07 1.16 1.29 1.39 0.82 1.07 1.36 1.35 0.95 0.72 
 
NOTE: Asterisked columns exclude observations where Person 2 received zero so could not take an action, resulting in a smaller number of 
observations. Reciprocation is the amount returned to Person 1 minus the amount invested by Person 1.  Non-reciprocation is equal to 
Reciprocation with the sign reversed. 
13 
 
 
Non-social emotions  
Result B: Non-social emotions (contentment, frustration) are similarly triggered by one’s own earnings 
across the Human, Robot1, and Robot2 conditions (Prediction 2). 
Contentment resulting from greater personal earnings was predicted to be similar for Person 1 and for 
Person 2 across conditions—because the non-social emotional response to personal gains should depend 
on the intrinsic properties of those gains (here, their magnitude), equally present in all conditions, and 
not on whether those gains were caused by a human partner, an algorithm, or some other cause that 
varies by condition. This is what we observed. Person 1 and Person 2 reported feeling more content the 
higher their personal earnings were from the interaction (see Figure 3 panels A and B). We report the 
mean and standard deviation of independent and dependent variables in Table 2, and the results of OLS 
regression, including standardized beta coefficients, below.  
For Person 1, contentment increased with earnings in the Human condition (βHuman = .577, t(84) = 6.44, p 
< .001), the Robot1 condition (βRobot1 = .281, t(70) = 2.44, p = .017), and the Robot2 condition (βRobot2 = 
.393, t(72) = 3.60, p = .001). Moreover, the relationship between Person 1’s contentment and their 
earnings did not differ significantly across conditions. We compared the coefficients of Person 1’s 
contentment as a function of their earnings across conditions to test the null hypotheses 
Ho1: βHuman = βRobot1 and Ho2: βHuman = βRobot2. We find a marginal difference between Human and Robot1 
conditions (t(155) = -1.900, p = .059), and no difference between Human and Robot2 conditions (t(157) = 
-1.130, p = .261).   
 
A.  
 
B. 
 
C. 
 
D. 
 Human condition:                     Robot1 condition:                         Robot2 condition: 
Fig. 3. Non-social emotions as a function of earnings  
For Person 2, positive relationships between their earnings and contentment were observed in the Human 
condition (βHuman =.482, t(84) = 5.01, p < .001) and in the Robot2 condition (βRobot2 =.446, t(72) = 4.20, p < 
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.001). We compared the coefficients of Person 2’s contentment as a function of Person 2’s earnings across 
conditions to test the null hypothesis Ho1:  βHuman = βRobot2. We find no difference between Human and 
Robot2 conditions (t(157) = 0.49, p = .622).  
Frustration resulting from smaller personal earnings was predicted to be similar for Person 1 and for 
Person 2 across conditions. This is what we observed. Person 1 and Person 2 reported feeling more 
frustrated the lower their personal earnings were from the interaction (see Figure 3 panels C and D). 
For Person 1, frustration decreased with earnings in the Human condition (βHuman = -.594, t(84) = -6.72, p 
< .001), the Robot1 condition (βRobot1 = -.333, t(70) = -2.93, p = .005), and the Robot2 condition (βRobot2 = -
.382, t(72) = -3.49, p = .001). Moreover, the relationship between Person 1’s frustration and their lower 
earnings did not differ significantly across conditions. We compared the coefficients of Person 1 
frustration as a function of their lower earnings across conditions to test the null hypotheses 
Ho1: βHuman = βRobot1 and Ho2: βHuman = βRobot2. We find no difference between Human and Robot1 
conditions (t(155) = 1.51, p = .133), and no difference between Human and Robot2 conditions (t(157) = 
1.40, p = .163). 
For Person 2, the negative relationship between their earnings and frustration was observed both in the 
Human condition (βHuman = -.529, t(84)= -5.68, p < .001), and in the Robot2 condition (βRobot2 = -.534, t(72)= 
-5.32, p < .001). We compared the coefficients of Person 2’s frustration as a function of Person 2’s earnings 
across conditions to test the null hypothesis Ho1:  βHuman = βRobot2. We find no difference between Human 
and Robot2 conditions (t(157) =.67, p =.505). 
Social emotions  
Result C: Social emotions (gratitude, anger, pride, guilt) resulting from trust game interactions sometimes 
differed across the Human, Robot1, and Robot2 conditions (Predictions 3-6). 
Higher investment predicted Person 1’s pride to a greater extent in the Human and Robot2 conditions 
than in the Robot1 condition—because in the former two conditions investment provides a human 
partner the opportunity to benefit, whereas in the latter condition there is no human partner (Prediction 
3). This is what we observed (see Figure 4 Panel A). Person 1 reported feeling more pride with higher 
investments in the Human (βHuman = .345, t(84) = 3.35, p = .001) and Robot2 conditions (βRobot2 = .355, t(72) 
= 3.20, p = .002); but this relationship was not significant in the Robot1 condition (βRobot1 = .159, t(70) = 
1.34, p = .184). Higher Person 1 earnings predicted Person 1’s pride in all conditions equally because they 
each provide equal opportunity for personal gain. We observed this as well. There is support for Person 1 
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reporting more pride with higher personal earnings in the Human (βHuman = .324, t(84) = 3.12, p = .002), 
Robot1 (βRobot1 = .493, t(70) = 4.71, p < .001), and Robot2 conditions (βRobot2 = .467, t(72)=4.45, p < .001).  
A B C D 
E  
 
F G 
 
H 
 Human condition:                      Robot1 condition:                            Robot2 condition: 
Fig. 4. Social emotions as a function of investment, reciprocation (= return - investment), and non-
reciprocation (= investment - return), by condition. 
Lower investment predicted Person 1s guilt to a greater extent in the Human and Robot2 conditions than 
in the Robot1 condition—because in the former two conditions failure to invest deprives a human partner 
from the opportunity to benefit, whereas in the latter condition there is no human partner (Prediction 3). 
This is what we observed (see Figure 4 Panel B).  Person 1 reported feeling less guilty with higher 
investments. This was true in the Human condition (βHuman = -.538, t(84) = -5.81, p < .001) and in the Robot2 
condition (βRobot2  =  -.321, t(72) = -2.86, p = .006), but not in the Robot1 condition (βRobot1 = -.004, t(70) = -
0.04, p = .971). Moreover, the relationship between Person 1’s guilt and their level of investment differed 
significantly between the Human condition and the Robot2 condition on the one hand, and the Robot1 
condition on the other hand (t(228) = 3.40, p = .001). 
Higher investment predicted Person 2’s gratitude in both the Human and Robot2 conditions—because 
Person 1’s investment provides Person 2 the opportunity to benefit (Prediction 4). This is what we 
observed (see Figure 4 Panel C). Person 2s reported feeling more gratitude with higher investment both 
in the Human condition (βHuman = .679, t(84) = 8.43, p < .001) and in the Robot2 condition (βRobot2  =  .666, 
t(72) = 7.52, p < .001). Moreover, the relationship between Person 2’s gratitude and higher investment 
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from Person 1 did not differ significantly between the Human condition and the Robot2 condition (t(157) 
= 0.30, p = .764). 
Lower investment predicted Person 2’s anger in the Human and Robot2 conditions because in these 
conditions Person 1’s investment provides a human partner the opportunity to benefit (Prediction 4). This 
is what we observed (see Figure 4 Panel D). Person 2s reported feeling more angry with lower investments 
in both the Human condition (βHuman = -.571, t(84) = -6.33, p < .001) and Robot2 condition (βRobot2  =  -.472, 
t(72) = - 4.51, p < .001). Further, the relationship between Person 2’s anger and lower investment was no 
different across the Human and Robot2 conditions (t(157) = 0.65, p = .516). 
Higher reciprocation predicted Person 1’s gratitude in the Human condition (where a partnered Person 
2’s decision positively affected Person 1’s gains from investment), but not in the Robot1 and Robot2 
conditions (where reciprocation decisions were automated) (Prediction 5). Considering only observations 
where Person 2 could make a reciprocation decision (cases where Person 1 invested more than $0), this 
is what we observed (see Figure 4 Panel E). Person 1s reported feeling more gratitude when reciprocation 
from the other party was higher. These results were stronger in the Human condition (βHuman = .699, t(73) 
= 8.29,  p < .001) than in the Robot1 condition (βRobot1  =  .416, t(65) = 3.66, p = .001) or the Robot2 condition 
(βRobot2 =.284, t(68) = 2.42, p = .018). Further, the relationship between Person 1’s gratitude and higher 
reciprocation differed significantly between the Human condition on the one hand, and the Robot1 and 
Robot2 conditions on the other hand (t(208) = 3.07, p = .002). 
Higher non-reciprocation predicted Person 1’s anger where a partnered Person 2’s decision affected 
Person 1’s losses from investment, but not in the Robot1 and Robot2 conditions where reciprocation 
decisions were automated (Prediction 5). Considering only observations where Person 2 could make a 
decision (cases where Person 1 invested more than $0), this is what we observed (see Figure 4 Panel F).  
Person 1s reported feeling more angry with higher non-reciprocation. This relationship was stronger in 
the Human condition (βHuman = .600, t(73) = 6.36, p < .001) than in the Robot1 condition (βRobot1  =  .277, 
t(65) = 2.31,  p =  .024) or the Robot2 condition (βRobot2 = .420, t(68) = 3.79, p < .001). And, importantly, the 
relationship between Person 1’s anger and being the victim of non-reciprocation differed significantly 
between the Human condition on the one hand, and the Robot1 and Robot2 conditions on the other hand 
(t(208) = 2.144, p = .033). 
Higher reciprocation predicted Person 2’s pride to a greater extent in the Human condition than in the 
Robot2 condition (Prediction 6). In the Human condition Person 2 decides to reciprocate determining 
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Person 1’s gains from investments, but in the Robot2 condition Person 2 makes no such decision. Having 
dropped observations when Person 2 received nothing and only considering only observations where 
Person 2 could make a reciprocation decision, this is what we observed (see Figure 4 Panel G). Person 2 
reported feeling more pride with higher reciprocation in the Human condition (βHuman = .571, t(73) = 5.90, 
p < .001) but not in the Robot2 condition (βRobot2  =  .076, t(68) =  0.62, p = .537). Higher Person 2 earnings 
also predicted Person 2’s pride in both Human and Robot2 conditions equally because they each provide 
equal opportunity for personal gain. This is what we observed. There is support for Person 2 reporting 
more pride with higher personal earnings in the Human (βHuman = .282, t(84) = 2.678, p = .009) and Robot2 
conditions (βRobot2 = .428, t(72) = 3.99, p < .001). And, critically, the relationship between Person 2’s pride 
and higher reciprocation differed significantly between the Human condition and the Robot2 condition 
(t(143) = 3.08, p = .003) despite the strong main effect of personal earnings on pride in both conditions. 
Higher non-reciprocation predicted Person 2’s guilt to a greater extent in the Human condition than in the 
Robot2 condition (Prediction 6). In the Human condition, Person 2’s non-reciprocation decision causes 
Person 1’s loss on investment, but in the Robot2 condition Person 2 makes no such decision. We drop 
observations when Person 2 received nothing, and, considering only observations where Person 2 could 
make a decision, this is what we observed (see Figure 4 Panel H).  Person 2 reported feeling more guilty 
with higher non-reciprocation in the Human condition (βHuman = .509, t(73) = 5.02, p < .001) but not in the 
Robot2 condition (βRobot2  =  .096, t(68) =  0.79, p = .433). And, critically, the relationship between Person 
2’s guilt and reciprocation to Person 1 differed significantly between the Human condition and the Robot2 
condition (t(142) = 3.24, p = .002).  
Discussion  
Natural selection designed emotions to solve adaptive problems by recalibrating cognition and behavior 
in fitness-promoting ways (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). As we increasingly put our trust in robots it is 
important to better understand our emotional reactions to interactions with them. Our study 
demonstrates yet another example of humans willing to take risks to engage in trust-based interactions 
with robots– similar to how they do with one another—yet experiencing different emotional reactions to 
those interactions. These differences were as predicted.  
Future research should examine how social emotions regulate trust conditional on past interactions with 
one’s partner, and whether trust-re-extension varies according to robot type. Above we report that 
trust-based interactions with fellow humans and with robots affecting fellow humans elicit more intense 
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social emotions—positive (pride and gratitude) and negative (guilt and anger)—compared to trust-based 
interactions with robots acting alone. 
Given that investors’ initial trust did not differ across trustee type but investors’ social emotions did, a 
distinct possibility is that trust re-extension will differ when the trustee is a human, a robot, or a robot 
linked to other human beneficiaries. For example, partnerships with consistent reciprocators may 
consolidate into stronger, more productive partnerships when the reciprocators are fellow humans, 
because humans elicit more gratitude than robots do. Conversely, partnerships with inconsistent 
reciprocators may be more stable when the reciprocators are robots, because robots elicit less anger 
than humans do. Further, humans experienced pride and guilt more intensely in interactions where 
robots served a beneficiary than where robots acted alone. This suggests that people will be even more 
likely to re-extend trust to robot partners when those robots link to other human beneficiaries. 
The human cognitive architecture evolved to have enough structure and content to promote our 
ancestors’ survival and reproduction while also having the flexibility to navigate novel challenges and 
opportunities. These features enable humans to design and rationally interact with AI and robots—agents 
whom our forager ancestors may never have imagined. Still, interactions with automata, and science’s 
ability to explain these interactions, are imperfect, because automata (i) lack the psychophysical cues that 
we evolved to expect in an interaction partners and (ii) often are guided by unintuitive decision logics. Our 
abilities to design, build, and interact with automata are testament to the power of human cognition. A 
behavioral science of human social interactions with AI and robots that harnesses this power has great 
promise. 
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